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Treaty Talks
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Treaty talks between US and Russia

George W Bush and Vladimir Putin met yesterday to discuss the issues surround missile defense. On the agenda was the possible breaking of the ABM treaty, reductions in conventional arms and the possible threat to use MIRVed.

Given all the Bush rhetoric about NMD, and the fact that in less than 5 months the US could be in contravention of the 1972 ABM treaty, the two leaders seem to have got on acceptably. I suspect that with no deal having been made, as one would predict given the face saving needed by both sides on this one, that there will be many long hours of SALT like negotiations to come (SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, whose meetings rumbled on for years before success, and then rumbled on again with SALT II only to be thwarted by the end of the Cold War.) But what is in the air?

  • The US will likely break ground on two bases to allow for firing NMD missiles - this use of 2 bases breaks the old 1972 ABM treaty.
  • The Russians should not, in theory, need to worry about NMD, they could saturate it easily. But there may be a case for suggesting that the Russians are low on active missiles, maybe as low as 100 or so. NMD plays a big role at such low numbers.
  • The Russians are asking for further warhead cuts.
  • The Russians have hinted that they might start to arm their missiles with MIRVs (Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles = lots of nukes in a single missiles nose). With this comes the unstated hint that MARVs could be just round the corner (MARV Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicle - nukes that can jink in space and change where they are aimed, devised to make the first generation of missile defense less effective).

How many missile bases?

Why the US needs to start work on two bases is still not really clear. It would, on the face of it, seem that to build the missile launch bases at a time nearer the detection of a threatening countries holding of missiles and threatening to use them would be more appropriate, this would allow for a more flexible defense. Say, for instance, Brazil got the nuclear bug and started to build nuclear tipped missiles, bases in Alaska would be useless. Or, heaven forbid, Queen Elizabeth got tired of the "special relationship" and ordered the Royal Navy to nuke New York, what good are bases in Alaska? While the current threat seems to be North Korea and China, Sub-orbital lobs would allow either country to go round the other way. If you have to break a treaty that has allowed some sense of stability, you might as well do it when there is a clear danger, and there is just no such thing at present. It would probably take about 12 months to build and integrate a new missile base into an existing system, why do it in a rush and upset every one now?

1,500. Count 'em

The Russians want missile warhead drawdowns, probably because they are faced with a terrible problem of not being able to maintain those they have. They certainly are not sailing their nuclear missile subs, or are sailing them infrequently. There have been indications that the Russians have been having trouble keeping the missile warheads in the ICBM's properly maintained with the gaseous supplements that are needed. If the Russians could parly their force size down with a commensurate reduction in the US force they would improve safety, probably increase the reliability of the remaining missiles and hence actually end up being better off. They are also trying to modernise their missile fleet, and this would be a ghastly expense if they had to do several thousand rockets, much better to only have to do, say, 800. The US has also talked about downsizing its warhead count unilaterally. This again, is probably due more to age and reliability than to any strategic nicety. Older Polaris subs are now all gone, and some of the Trident boats are getting on in years, additionally the Peacemaker missiles (about 100 of them) have not fit well and may be scrapped. These natural reductions will be ignored (all missiles will be perfectly effective, and totally reliable) if we need to get into multilateral reduction talks, talks that include the NMD system.

What number have I in my head, now?

The threat to attach MIRVs to the top of the Russian fleet would instantly increase the warhead count that Russia is capable of firing. It would make an already ineffective NMD system (if pointed in Russia's direction) even less effective. It could also cause the warming relations between China and Russia to have a little misstep. China is mad enough about NMD, but to suddenly find that there are (potentially) many more warheads aimed at it would be aggravating.

MIRVs came out of the darkest days of the 1960's. They were later followed by testing on MRVs or MARVs which offered even more kill for the Dollar and Ruble. MARVs were outlawed by the SALT treaty. However, if we get into a treaty busting mode, who says what will be next of the list of things that we don't really like and hence will ignore?

 

AM © July 2001

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