Changing Times For Procurement

The recent cancellation of the Crusader Artillery system could have far reaching ramifications for all manner of defense projects, the cancellation comes amidst a re-evaluation of what it is to fight a war and what tools are going to be needed to do it. Crusader was a remarkably advanced artillery system, probably well in advance of anything else on the drawing boards around the world, yet it died because it was ultimately not mobile enough, its tail was too long.

What does this say for some of the fighter systems the armed services are looking at getting? Does JSF bear up if we start to look at what it will take to field? Is the Commanche deployable enough for the new way we intend to wage war?

The Army has been under considerable pressure for some years to cut the logistic tail it needs to field brigade and divisional strength units. There have been issues with the fact that the M1 tank requires sea transportation to move it (requiring more time); that Apache helicopters require far too many C-5 trips to be deployed, not for the helicopters but all the paraphernalia they need to run the squadrons; that the Crusader would have required a large logistic operation to field a battery. The Army has paid a severe price for this lack of logistic restraint, but is the airforce doing any better a job?

The B2 operates from Whiteman AFB. There are only 22 B2's, of course, so they all neatly fit on one base, but the fact that the maintenance and operational issues practically limit the deployment of these bombers to Whiteman means that usage rates are low. Ancient B52's and newer B1's can be deployed and hence their utilization rates are much higher.

If F-22 maintenance becomes an issue, particularly to maintain its stealthiness, what are the ramifications for further fleet purchases? Will the smitten Army turn around and say, "You killed our gun, we're not about to give your plane life."

Inter-service politics are not new to the Pentagon, far from it, but the Crusader cancellation has raised a lot of hackles. The Army was looking forward to getting a tool that would give it significant tactical power in the field, however they were waylaid by the Airforce and Navy's growing ground attack role. The Army could not easily deploy to Afghanistan, but the airforce could still drop bombs on mountainside bunkers. Those 50 year old B52's and slightly younger B1's did a good job pounding the ground ahead of the special forces, a job the Crusader was intended to acquit itself at.

So if F22's and F35's are to see the light of day, the designers and tacticions need to look at the implication maintenance and UAV's are going to play in the perceptions of the boys in the Pentagon.